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Abstract 
This study analyzes the effect of reduction in input and output tariffs on the intra-plant wage inequality in 
India, which is one of the most unskilled labor abundant countries, for the period 2000 to 2007. We find 
that a reduction in output tariff increases the wage inequality, whereas a reduction in input tariff does not 
have any statistically significant effect on wage inequality. These results suggest that the 
Stolper-Samuelson effect works in the Indian manufacturing sector where unskilled labor-intensive 
industries were protected the most prior to trade liberalization. We also examine the effect of the 
increased demand for skilled workers by the modern service sector, which has been the driving force of 
recent economic growth in India. The increased demand raises the wage inequality in manufacturing 
implying that skill-biased technological change in modern service sector has an indirect effect on wage 
inequality in this sector. 
 
Keywords: trade liberalization, wage inequality, India, the Stolper- Samuelson effect, skill biased 
technical change, tariff 
 
1. Introduction 
 
How does trade liberalization affect wage inequality in developing countries? The 
existing literature on developing economies mainly focuses on middle-income countries 
such as Brazil, Columbia, and Mexico1. There is evidence that middle-income countries 
                                            
1 See Goldberg and Pavcinik (2007) and Anderson (2005). 
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experience skill-biased technical change (hereafter SBTC) (Berman and Machin, 
2000) and that trade induced technical change leads to a rise in wage inequality (Caselli, 
2014; Gallego, 2012 and Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998). This study, by contrast, 
focuses on India, which is one of the most unskilled-labor abundant countries, and 
provides evidence that is consistent with a different mechanism that explains the 
increase in wage inequality in manufacturing after trade liberalization: the Stolper- 
Samuelson effect (hereafter S-S effect). As the Indian government protected unskilled 
labor-intensive industries prior to trade liberalization, the benefit to the unskilled labor 
force from the concentration of production in unskilled labor-intensive sectors after 
trade liberalization decreases and the wage inequality widens.  
 Until recently, India’s trade regime was among the most restrictive in Asia in 
terms of nominal tariffs and nontariff barriers. India launched a radical economic reform 
in 1991 in the aftermath of a balance-of-payments crisis wherein tariffs were cut 
dramatically and most quantitative restrictions on import of capital goods and 
intermediate inputs were removed. In the 2000s, trade liberalization took rapid steps 
forward and the tariff fell steadily. In the early 2000s, the Indian government eased 
quantitative restrictions on the import of manufactured consumer goods and agricultural 
products. The trade liberalization period witnessed an increase in the wage inequality 
between nonproduction and production workers in the Indian manufacturing sector. 
Figure 1 illustrates this inverse relationship between tariffs and relative wage for the 
period between 2000 and 2007.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average relative wage in plants, output tariffs, and input tariffs between 2000 and 2007. 
 
Note: Based on author’s calculation using ASI and WITS data. 
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 Goldberg and Pavcinik (2007) compiled studies on the relationship between 
trade liberalization and wage inequality in developing countries, most of which suggest 
that trade liberalization increases wage inequality. Traditional trade theory, like the S-S 
effect predicts that trade liberalization decreases wage inequality in an unskilled labor 
abundant country in a Heckscher-Ohlin (hereafter H-O) world. Moreover, the model 
provides explanations for the increase in equality. The first explanation applies the S-S 
effect to an unskilled labor abundant country where the unskilled labor-intensive sectors 
are protected the most prior to a trade reform. The benefit to the unskilled labor force 
from the concentration of production in unskilled labor-intensive sectors decreases if 
these sectors are protected most prior to trade liberalization because these sectors are the 
worst affected by tariff cuts. Attanasio et al. (2004) indicates that the S-S effect worked 
in Colombia where unskilled labor-intensive industries were heavily protected prior to 
trade liberalization. The second explanation is skill-biased technical change (SBTC). 
SBTC arises from the incorporation of new technologies embodied in cheaper imported 
capital goods, such as machines and office equipment, or intermediate goods that are 
complementary to skilled workers in unskilled labor-intensive economies. It is relatively 
easy for firms to import or access imported capital goods after trade liberalization. 
Therefore, SBTC benefits skilled workers, thus increasing the wage inequality. 
 We analyze how reduction in output and input tariffs affect the intra-plant 
wage inequality between nonproduction and production workers using plant level data 
in the Indian manufacturing sector for the period 2000 to 2007. We also discuss if the 
effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of the S-S effect and SBTC.  
 Our estimation results indicate that tariff reduction in final goods increases 
wage inequality; whereas, tariff reduction in intermediate inputs has statistically 
insignificant effect on wage inequality even when the plant directly imports the 
intermediate inputs. These results are consistent with the explanation based on the S-S 
effect. 
 However, it is possible that SBTCs in other sectors affect increased inequality 
in manufacturing. In the 2000s, the Indian modern service sector including IT sector 
grew at a rapid pace. Due to the requirement of computer and English language skills, 
most workers in this sector are skilled. The increased demand for skilled worker in the 
modern service sector may put upward pressure on the wage of skilled labor in 
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manufacturing. We examine this hypothesis and find that this increased demand for 
skilled worker by the modern service sector does increase the wage inequality in 
manufacturing. This suggests that SBTC in the modern service sector has an indirect 
effect on inequality in manufacturing. 
 The existing studies on the relationship between trade policy and wage 
inequality in India yield mixed conclusions. Sen (2008) uses industry level data from 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for the period 1973 to 1997 to find that trade 
liberalization triggers the increase in wage inequality. He suggests that the decline in 
protection mostly for the unskilled labor-intensive industries leads to a relative fall in 
the economy-wide return to unskilled labor as compared to skilled labor. Furthermore, 
he finds that a negative relationship between the degree of protection, which is 
measured as the effective rate of protection and import penetration ratio, and wage 
inequality at the industry level suggesting that trade-induced technological progress 
leads to an increase in wage inequality within industries. Moreover, Hashim and Banga 
(2009) use the dynamic industry panel data estimations (GMM) for 58 manufacturing 
industries for the period from 1998 to 2004 to find that trade liberalization leads to an 
increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. In contrast to these 
studies, Kumar and Mishra (2005) use individual level data collected by the Indian 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) to find that trade liberalization leads to a 
decrease in wage inequalities. They evaluate the impact of the 1991 trade liberalization 
on the industry wage structure and find that the reduction in trade protection widens 
differences in wages across industries for similar workers in terms of observable 
characteristics over time. As different industries employ different proportion of skilled 
workers, changes in wages across industries translate into changes in relative incomes 
of skilled and unskilled workers. According to them, tariff reductions are relatively 
large in sectors with higher proportion of unskilled workers and these sectors 
experience an increase in wages, which implies that the unskilled workers experience an 
increasing wage relative to skilled workers. The results of this study are consistent with 
former studies that use plant level data from ASI. 
 An important difference of this study from other existing studies is that we 
distinguish output tariffs from input tariffs. This approach allows us to identify how 
trade liberalization affects wage inequality through increased input or output 
competition. Sen (2008) suggests that SBTC works in manufacturing based on the 
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finding of a negative and significant relationship between the degree of protection, 
which is measured as the effective rate of protection and import penetration ratio, and 
the wage inequality at the sectoral level. However, he does not distinguish the effects of 
tariff reduction in imported output from imported input on wage inequality because the 
effective rate of protection, which is a measure of the total effect of output and input 
tariffs and import penetration ratio, is affected not only by input tariff reduction but also 
by other factors. 
 Another important difference from the existing works is the focus on the 
intra-plant wage inequality. An advantage of the plant level data is that it is possible to 
control the plant characteristics, such as plant size, skill share, and the proportion of 
contract labor, that can affect wages. Another benefit of conducting the analysis at the 
plant level is that we can allow for differential effects between domestically oriented 
firms and globalized firms. Bernard and Jensen (1997) and Verhoogen (2008) suggest 
that the wage inequality in globalized firms is much higher than that in domestic firms. 
However, we do not observe the differences in the intra-plant wage inequality between 
domestic and globalized plants in our estimation. 
 Few studies have examined the impact of tariff reduction on intra-plant (or 
firm) wage inequality using plant (or firm) level unit data in developing countries. 
Whether tariff reduction widens or shrinks the wage inequality depends on the 
characteristics of the target countries. Amiti and Cameron (2012) and Albada (2013) 
find that reducing tariffs decreases wage inequality within firms in Indonesia and the 
Philippines respectively. Amiti and Cameron (2012) find that reducing input tariffs 
decreases the wage inequality within firms importing intermediate goods. Albada 
(2013) suggests that a firm responds to import competition by shifting to manufacturing 
of products with lower value, which requires unskilled workers, and substituting 
self-produced intermediate goods with imported intermediate goods. By contrast, 
Cacelli (2014) finds that wage inequality increases along with tariff reduction in Mexico, 
and tariff reduction in machinery and equipment that embody skilled-worker favoring 
technology increases the wage inequality within plant. The present study is the first to 
investigate and analyze the channels through which trade liberalization could 
affect intra-plant wage differentials using plant level data in India. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of wage inequality and trade liberalization in India. Section 3 provides the 
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theoretical background that could explain the increase in wage inequality after trade 
liberalization in India. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy. Section 5 describes 
the data and measurement of key variables. Section 6 presents the estimation results and 
Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Wage Inequality and Trade Liberalization in India  
This section reviews the wage inequality in the Indian manufacturing sector and the 
historical background of trade policy since its independence.  
 
2.1 Wage Inequality in India 
The wage inequality has widened in India since the mid-1980s. Pandey and Shetty 
(2014) indicate that the share of earnings accounting to production workers in total 
earnings fell from 65% in 1981 to 47% in 2011, but the proportion of production 
workers in the total number of workers employed remained unchanged at about 78%. 
The divergence between white and blue-collar wages began during the mid-1980s and 
increased over time, especially after 1991 (Chamarbagwala and Sharma, 2007). The 
present study focuses on the period from 2000 to 2007. Figure 1 indicates that 
nonproduction workers earn 3.4 times higher wage than production workers in 2000, 
but 5 times higher in 2007 in our sample.  
 
2.2 Trade Liberalization in India  
India’s experience with trade liberalization through tariff reduction began in the 
mid-1980s, which was also the period when the wage inequality between nonproduction 
and production workers started increasing. Prior to the trade liberalization, unskilled 
labor-intensive industries were heavily protected.  
 After independence, India adopted import-substituting industrialization. 
Initially, the government strictly regulated import through quotas rather than tariffs. The 
regulation was imposed mostly on the import of consumer goods (unskilled 
labor-intensive goods) and not on capital and intermediate goods (skilled 
labor-intensive goods). Since the late 1970s, the government began a slow but sustained 
relaxation of import regulations on capital goods and intermediate goods. In the 
mid-1980s, under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, India shifted from quantitative import 
controls to a protective system based on tariffs and took some cautious steps to 
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encourage the import of capital goods, while consumer goods continued to be heavily 
protected, now by high tariff in place of rigid quotas. 
 Trade policy was an important component of the economic reforms of 1991. 
During the foreign trade policy from 1992 to 19972, the average tariffs fell from more 
than 87% in 1990 to 39% by 1996 (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). The 1991 reform 
removed most of the quantitative restrictions on the import of capital goods and 
intermediate inputs. As indicated by Kumar and Mishra (2005) and Sen (2008), these 
dramatic economic reforms affected the unskilled labor-intensive sectors the most. This 
phenomenon can also be observed in other developing countries, such as Mexico and 
Colombia, where the unskilled labor-intensive industries experienced the largest tariff 
reductions (Hanson and Harrison, 1999 and Attanasio et al., 2004). 
 The foreign trade policy from 1997 to 2002 did not carry forward the tariff 
reduction further. Quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactured consumer goods 
and agricultural products were finally removed on April 1, 2001. The subsequent 
foreign trade policy from 2002 to 2007 was in line with the agenda of trade 
liberalization. In 2002, the government signaled a return to tariff reduction policy. In 
our sample period, the average output tariffs in the Indian manufacturing fell from 35% 
in 2000 to 18% in 2007 and over this same period, the average input tariffs fell from 
24% to 11% (See Figure 1).  
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the reduction in output tariff 
during the period from 1990 to 2007 and the ratio of unskilled workers in an industry in 
2000. This indicates that the unskilled labor-intensive industries experienced larger 
tariff cuts. Table 1 indicates the positive and significant relationship between the 
reduction in output tariff and the ratio of unskilled workers in an industry. 
 One of the unskilled labor-intensive industries is textiles and clothing. This 
industry employs around 35 million people and is the largest manufacturing industry in 
India in terms of employment. It accounted for 4% of the GDP, 14% of the total 
industrial production in 2004, and 8.62% of total employment. Labor productivity in the 
textiles and clothing industry is lower than that in other manufacturing industries3 
                                            
2 Import-export policy 1997-2002. 
3 According to figures by the Department of Heavy Industry, labor productivity measured in terms of 
gross value added per employee is 1.48 for weaving and spinning, and 1.61 for other textile 
manufacturing, which is lower than that for machinery (3.31), iron and steel (7.45), and automobiles 
(10.6). 
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(WTO, Trade Policy Review, 2006). The average output tariff in this sector decreased 
from 100% in 1990 to 12.5% in 2007. The tariff reduction in this sector is 87.5% and 
this reduction is 10% larger than the average tariff reduction in the other manufacturing 
industries.  
 
Figure 2. Reduction in output tariffs between 2000 and 2007 and the share of unskilled workers in 2000 
 
 
Note: Based on author’s calculation using WITS data. 
 
Table 1. Regression result for reduction in output tariffs between 2000 and 2007 and the share of 
unskilled workers in 2000 
 
Notes:	 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
3. Theoretical Background 
In the previous section, we can observe that the relative wage of nonproduction to 
production workers increases during the period from 2000 to 2007 period when tariff 
reduction steps forward. This section reviews the two theoretical perspectives on the 
positive effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality, the S-S theorem and 
skill-biased technical change. 
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 Goldberg and Pavcinik (2007) compiled studies on the relationship between 
trade liberalization and wage inequality in developing countries such as Mexico, 
Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and India and found that trade liberalization 
increases wage inequality in most studies. However, in an H-O world with a single cone 
of diversification, the standard S-S effect predicts that the wage inequality in unskilled 
labor abundant country decreases under trade liberalization. They provide two possible 
explanations for the puzzle. First explanation focuses on the inconsistency in the 
assumptions of the H-O theory. Previous research indicates that the unskilled 
labor-intensive sectors are protected the most prior to trade reform, and are affected the 
most by tariff cuts. As trade liberalization affects most in these sectors, the economy 
wide return to unskilled labor should decrease. Therefore, the widening of the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers is exactly what the S-S effect predicts. Hanson 
and Harrison (1999) provide the result that the S-S effect worked in Mexico where the 
unskilled labor-intensive industries were heavily protected prior to trade liberalization.  
 The other line of explanation for the increased demand for skilled labor is 
SBTC. Wood (1994, 1995, 1997) and Acemoglu (2003) indicate that trade liberalization 
may well be a driving force of changes in technology. SBTC arises from the 
incorporation of new technologies embodied in cheaper imported capital goods, such as 
machines and office equipment, or intermediate goods that are complementary to skilled 
workers in unskilled labor-intensive countries. It is relatively easy for firms to import or 
access such imported capital after trade liberalization. Therefore, SBTC benefits skilled 
workers, thus increasing the wage inequality.  
 
4. Estimation Strategy  
This section explains how to estimate the impact of tariff reduction on wage inequality. 
The results of the estimation are consistent with the theoretical predictions that we 
discussed in the previous section.  
 Our estimation strategy involves using the industry variation in tariffs over 
time to identify how reductions in the four-digit industry level output tariffs and in the 
three-digit industry level input tariffs affect the intra-plant wage inequality. The 
dependent variable is the wage inequality measured by the log of the ratio of the 
average wage of nonproduction workers to the average wage of production workers. 
 
 
10 
Following Amiti and Cameron (2012), we estimate the reduced form equation4 as 
under 
 ln 𝑤!𝑤! !,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!,! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!,! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!,! ∗ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!,! 
	 	 	 	 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!,! + 𝑍!,!,!Γ + 𝜀!,!,! . 
 
In the above equation, ln 𝑤!/𝑤! !,!,! and 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!,! are the variables representing 
wage inequality and the plant’s share of imported intermediate goods within plant 𝑓 in 
industry 𝑖  in year 𝑡  respectively. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!,!  and 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!,!  are input 
tariff at three-digit industry level and output tariff at four-digit industry level in year 𝑡. 
All specifications also include plant fixed effect, 𝛼!, and state-year fixed effect, 𝛼!,!, to 
control time-invariant characteristics of the plant and the time-variant shocks affecting 
states differently respectively5. The vector 𝑍!,!,! in the equation controls for the time 
varying plant-level characteristics such as the plant’s size, import share, the skill share 
(measured as the ratio of the number of nonproduction workers to the total employed), 
and the share of contract workers in production workers. The plant’s import share is 
included to control the difference in the wage inequality between importers and 
non-importers because Bernard and Jensen (1997) and Verhoogen (2008) found that the 
wage inequality in globalized firms is much higher than that in domestic firms. We 
include the size of the plant because the wage structure may be different between small 
plants and large plants. The skill share represents the relative supply of skilled workers 
and a higher share of contract labor in production workers widens the inequality 
because the wages of contract workers are less than the wages of regular workers and 
are mostly equal to or less than the minimum wage decided by the state. In recent years, 
                                            
4 Although Amiti and Cameron (2012) include the interaction term between the export share of a firm 
and its output tariff, we could not include it because we were not able to identify from our data if a plant 
exported or not. 
5 The economy wide effects on the wage structures would be absorbed by the year–state dummy. For 
example, the minimum wage is important for the wage structure. The minimum wage is different among 
states and changes over time. As we can observe, the number of contract labor increased in the Indian 
manufacturing sector. Therefore, wage inequality might be affected by the level of minimum wages. 
Moreover, the labor regulations of each state may affect wage inequality. Besley and Burgess (2004) 
measure the strength of labor regulation in different states using the amendment in Industrial Dispute Act 
(IDA) for which the state government has the authority. They indicate that pro-worker amendments of the 
IDA are associated with lowered investment, employment, productivity, and output in registered 
manufacturing, and increased urban poverty.  
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the replacement of regular workers with contract workers has become a common 
phenomenon in Indian manufacturing (Goldar and Aggarwal, 2012). 
 First, consider the effect of reducing output tariff. The reduction in output 
tariffs makes the domestic market for the final goods competitive because the imported 
final goods become relatively cheap. The S-S effect in a standard H-O world, in which 
the government decreases output tariffs uniformly across industries, predicts the 
decrease in wage inequality because India, which is one of the most unskilled labor 
abundant countries, specializes more in producing unskilled labor-intensive goods, thus 
increasing the relative demand for unskilled labor. This implies that the coefficient of 
the output tariff, 𝛽!, is positive.  
 However, as mentioned earlier, India protected the unskilled labor-intensive 
sectors through high tariffs prior to trade liberalization. This situation is different from 
one in a standard H-O world. Prior to trade liberalization, the output price of unskilled 
labor-intensive industries and the wage of unskilled workers are relatively high. 
Although India is an unskilled labor abundant country, the S-S effect predicts the 
increase of wage inequality between unskilled and skilled labor. If this is the case, the 
coefficient of output tariff, 𝛽!, is negative. 
 Second, consider the effects of reducing input tariffs on the wage inequality. 
A reduction in input tariffs makes the relatively high quality import inputs cheaper. If 
these imported intermediate inputs embody skill-biased technology, then their increased 
use raises the demand for skilled labor and wage inequality. We call this case 
trade-induced SBTC. The coefficient of the interaction term between input tariff and 
import share would capture the direct impact of the reduction of input tariff because 
import plants directly use these imported inputs. The term input tariff describes the 
indirect or spillover effect on non-importers. If this effect is present, the coefficient of 
input tariff, 𝛽!, and the coefficient of the interaction term between input tariff and the 
plant’s input share, 𝛽!, are both negative.  
 
5. Data and Measurement 
5.1. Data 
We use plant level panel data of the Indian manufacturing sector for the period from 
2000 to 2007. The unit level information comes from the Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI) data, undertaken by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), which is the 
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annual census-cum-sample survey of the formal manufacturing plants. The ASI data 
cover two sets of surveys, census and sample. The census survey captures all enterprises 
hiring more than 100 workers. To construct the panel data in which it is possible to 
control the time-invariant plant’s fixed effect, we consider only the plants belonging to 
the census sector. 
 
5.2. Measurement of main variables 
 The main variables we use for the estimations are as follows. The wage 
inequality between nonproduction and production workers is the ratio of the wage rate 
of the supervisory and managerial staff to the wage of floor-level workers. Each wage 
rate is calculated as the average daily wage per worker, derived from a division of total 
emolument paid by the plant to the nonproduction (production) workers by the number 
of nonproduction (production) workers counted as man days. The total emolument 
includes not only wages but also bonus, contribution to provident and other funds, and 
workman and staff welfare expenses. As is the standard in the literature, we define 
skilled workers to be nonproduction workers and unskilled workers to be production 
workers. 
 We construct a database of annual output tariff data from 2000 to 2007 based 
on the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data. Tariff data for India are drawn at 
the four-digit of the Harmonized System (HS) classification, which are converted to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3 
(ISIC Rev.3) by using the appropriate concordance table available from the WITS. 
Four-digit level National Industrial Classification (NIC) 98 set by the Indian 
government in 1998 has a one to one correspondence with ISIC Rev.3. Therefore, 
output tariff is at the four-digit industry level. The input tariff for industry 𝑗 is 
constructed as	  𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!" = 𝛼!"! ∙ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓!", 
where 𝛼!" is the share of input 𝑠 in the value of output 𝑗, which is calculated from the 
1998 Input-Output (IO) table. The industrial classification of the IO table is at the 
three-digit NIC level. Therefore, input tariff for the industry is at the three-digit industry 
level.  
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 The relationship between wage inequality and tariffs would be affected by the 
time varying plant-level characteristics. In order to control for those effects, we include 
the skill share measured as the ratio of the number of nonproduction workers to the total 
employment, the size of the plant measured by the log of the plant’s total labor force 
counted as man days, and the ratio of the number of contract labor to the total number 
of production workers as control variables (See Appendix A. for summary of definition 
of main variables).  
  
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 indicates the descriptive statistics of the main variables (the variable 
named the share of modern service sector in the State Domestic Product (hereafter SDP) 
is used in section 6.2). The sample size is 100,304 for the period from 2000 to 2007. 
The dependent variable of the regression, log of wage inequality, has a sample average 
of 1.185. This implies that the wage of nonproduction is 327% of the wage of 
production worker on an average.  
 Output tariff and input tariff imposed on the sample plants are on an average 
27% and 15% respectively. Output tariff is higher than input tariff by about 10%. The 
average import share (the share of imported intermediate goods in total intermediate 
goods used in production) is only 9%, reflecting that two third of the plants are 
non-importers.  
 The average size of the plant measured as the log of the plant’s total labor 
force counted as man-days is 10, which implies that a plant employs, on annual average, 
about 22,000 man-days. The average skill share is 10% and this ratio ranges from about 
0 to 94%. The average ratio of contract labor is 20%. As mentioned earlier, this ratio 
increased from 15% in 2000 to 22% in 2007 and peaked at 23% in 2004. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: Based on author’s calculation using ASI and WITS data. 
 
6. Results  
This section presents the estimation results and provides the theoretical interpretation of 
the results. 
 
6.1 Baseline Results 
Table 3 indicates the baseline results. We include only output tariff in column 1 and 
input tariff in column 2. In the former case, the coefficient is negative and significant 
indicating that a fall in output tariff is associated with an increase in the wage inequality 
between nonproduction and production workers, whereas in the latter case the 
coefficient is negative but insignificant. These results suggest that increased wage 
inequality after trade liberalization is coinciding with the S-S effect wherein the 
unskilled labor-intensive sectors are protected the most prior to a trade reform. In 
column 3 where we include both output tariffs and input tariffs, the coefficient of output 
tariff remains negative and significant, and the coefficient of input tariff is positive but 
insignificant.  
 We further explore whether the effect of input tariff reduction is different 
between importers and non-importers of intermediate goods. In column 4, we include 
the interaction term between input tariff and the plant’s input share. The coefficient of 
the interaction term and that of the input tariff are both insignificant. This suggests that 
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imported inputs do not have any effect on the wage inequality, and implies that SBTC 
in manufacturing does not affect wage inequality.  
 Our results might be biased because of some omitted variables such as time 
varying plant-level characteristics. Therefore, we add the skill share in column 5, the 
size of plant measured by the log of the plant’s total labor force in column 6, and the 
ratio of contract labor within production workers in column 7. The coefficient on the 
skill share is negative and significant indicating that an increase in the share of 
nonproduction workers within a plant is associated with lower wage inequality. 
Although the size of plant does not matter for the wage inequality, the coefficient of the 
ratio of contract labor is positive and significant indicating that replacing regular 
workers with contract workers is cost cutting and widens the wage inequality between 
nonproduction and production workers. 
 
Table 3. Baseline Results 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level.	 * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
16 
6.2 Effect of SBTC on the Modern Service sector 
The modern service sector in India is growing at a rapid pace and the demand for skilled 
labor in this sector is expanding along with it. The modern service sector includes 
communication, banking and insurance, and real estate, ownership of dwellings and 
business services. It is relatively easy for a skilled worker than an unskilled worker 
employed in the manufacturing sector to move to this sector. In other words, the labor 
market for skilled worker is integrated, while that for unskilled worker is fragmented 
between the manufacturing sector and the modern service sector. Therefore, the demand 
for skilled workers in the modern service sector is important for the demand for skilled 
workers in the manufacturing sector. In the baseline specification, we try to absorb the 
effect of the demand in modern service sector on wage inequality in manufacturing by 
the year-state dummy variable. However, in order to distinguish the effect of the 
increased demand of the modern service sector on wage inequality in manufacturing 
from other factors included in the year-state dummy variable, we include the share of 
the modern service sector in SDP as a proxy for the demand for skilled workers in that 
sector. Table 4 indicates that the output tariff reduction still increases the wage 
inequality. More importantly, the increase in the modern service sector’s share in SDP 
contributes to increased wage inequality in manufacturing. This suggests that SBTC in 
modern service sector affects wage inequality in manufacturing. 
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Table 4. Effect of SBTC on Modern Service sector 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we analyze the relationship between trade liberalization and intra-plant 
wage inequality between nonproduction and production workers using plant level data 
in the Indian manufacturing sector. We also discuss if the effects of trade liberalization 
on wage inequality are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the S-S effect and 
SBTC. Our estimation results indicate that tariff reduction in final goods increases wage 
inequality, but tariff reduction in intermediate inputs does not have a statistically 
significant effect on wage inequality. These results suggest that the S-S effect works in 
India manufacturing where unskilled labor-intensive industries are protected the most 
prior to trade liberalization. 
 We also consider the increased demand for skilled worker by the modern 
service sector including the IT sector. Due to the requirements of computer and English 
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language skills, the modern service sector, which is growing at a rapid pace, demands 
larger number of skilled workers. This increased demand for skilled workers would 
widen the wage inequality in the manufacturing sector because it is relatively easy for 
the skilled workers in the manufacturing sector to move to the modern service sector. 
Moreover, a manufacturing plant needs to offer a higher wage to skilled workers. Our 
results indicate that the increase in the share of modern service sector in SDP 
contributes to an increase in wage inequality in manufacturing. This suggests that SBTC 
in modern service sector affects wage inequality in manufacturing. 
 In future studies, we plan to include variables indicating labor market 
conditions, such as the minimum wage, the Besley and Burguss index, and unionization 
rate, in our estimation in order to confirm the robustness of our results. In addition, we 
plan to deal with possible endogeneity of tariff rates that might have a bias on the 
results. For example, it could be the case that politically powerful industries are able to 
successfully lobby the government for trade protection.  
 
 
 
Appendix 
A. Main variables 
Table A.1. Definition of main variables 
  
  
 
 
19 
Reference 
1. Acemoglu, D. (2003). Patterns of Skill Premium. The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 199-230. 
2. Aldaba, R. M. (2013). Impact of Trade Liberalization on Wage Skill Premium in Philippine 
Manufacturing. Discussion Paper. 
3. Amiti, M., & Cameron, L. (2012). Trade Liberalization and the Wage Skill Premium: Evidence 
from Indonesia. Journal of International Economics, 87(2), 277-287. 
4. Anderson, E. (2005). Openness and inequality in developing countries: A review of theory and 
recent evidence. World Development, 33(7), 1045-1063. 
5. Attanasio, O., Goldberg, P. and Pavcnik, N. (2004). Trade Reforms and Wage Inequality in 
Colombia.  Journal of Development Economics, 74, 331-66.  
6. Berman, E, J Bound & S Machin (1998). Implications of Skill-biased Technological Change: 
International Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1245-1279. 
7. Berman, E & S Machin (2000). Skill-biased Technology Transfer: Evidence of Factor Biased 
Technological Change in Developing Countries. NBER working paper series. 
8. Bernard, A. B., & Jensen, J. B. (1997). Exporters, Skill Upgrading, and the Wage Gap. Journal of 
international Economics, 42(1), 3-31. 
9. Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2004). Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence 
from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 91-134. 
10. Chamarbagwala, R., & Sharma, G. (2008). Industrial Deregulation, Skill Upgrading, and Wage 
Inequality in India. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 2. 
11. Caselli, M. (2014). Trade, Skill-biased Technical Change and Wages in Mexican 
Manufacturing. Applied Economics, 46(3), 336-348. 
12. Gallego, F. (2012). Skill premium in Chile: studying skill upgrading in the south. World 
Development, 40, 594–609 
13. Goldar, B., & Aggarwal, S. C. (2012). Informalization of industrial labor in India: Effects of Labor 
Market Rigidities and Import Competition. The Developing Economies, 50(2), 141-169. 
14. Goldberg, P. K., & Pavcnik, N. (2007). Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing 
Countries. Journal of Economic Literature, 45(1), 39-82. 
15. Hanson, G.H. and Harrison, A. (1999). Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality in Mexico. 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 52(2), 271-88. 
16. Hashim, D., & Banga, R. (2009). Impact of trade on labour productivity and wage inequality in 
India (No. 35200). University Library of Munich, Germany. 
17. Kumar, U., & Mishra, P. (2008). Trade liberalization and wage inequality: Evidence from 
 
 
20 
India. Review of Development Economics, 12(2), 291-311. 
18. Pandey, S. J., & Shetty, S. L. (2014). ASI Results for 2011/12: A More Positive View of the 
Industrial Scene. Economic Political Weekly, 49, 89-93. 
19. Pursell, G. (1992), Trade Policy in India. National trade policies, 423-458. 
20. Sen, K. (2008). Trade policy and wage inequality: evidence from Indian manufacturing. Indian 
Growth and Development Review, 1(2), 147-171. 
21. Topalova, P., & Khandelwal, A. (2011). Trade liberalization and firm productivity: The case of 
India. Review of economics and statistics, 93(3), 995-1009. 
22. Verhoogen, E. A. (2008). Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican 
Manufacturing Sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 489-530. 
23. Wood, A. (1994), North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a 
Skill-Driven World, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
24. Wood, A. (1995).  How trade hurt unskilled workers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(3), 
57-80. 
25. Wood, A. (1997). Openness and wage inequality in developing countries: the Latin American 
challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom. The World Bank Research Observer, 11 (1), 33-57. 
26. World Trade Organization. (2006). Trade Policy Review. India, Geneva: WTO. 
